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PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT IN NEW MEXICO

In Garmond v. Kinney,' the New Mexico Supreme Court held that
an easement by prescription had not been acquired where land use
was permissive and in common with that of the general public. This
decision is the latest in a line of decisions which have recounted the
elements necessary to establish an easement by prescription. The
Garmond decision reflects a restriction of the elements upon which
prescriptive easements will be granted. This comment will discuss the
history and development of prescriptive easements in the common
law and in New Mexico and will examine the requisite elements for
their establishment.
THE FACTS IN GARMOND v. KINNEY
Stella Garmond and Beverly Flores, sisters, sued Edward Kinney
seeking a prescriptive easement over land owned by Kinney Brick
Company and used for mining clay. Garmond and Flores had acquired title to the land from their mother, Alcie Ingram Smith. In
1953 they subdivided the land into San Miguel Acres. Plaintiffs still
own many of the 136 lots in the subdivision.
The subdivision was served by an access road off what is presently
Highway 14. The road had been continuously used in its present
location for over fifty years, first by Alcie Smith and then by plaintiffs. In 1953 the United States Forest Service granted Alcie Smith a
Special Use Permit to use and improve the road. The permit's issuance was conditional upon Mrs. Smith's obtaining permission from
Kinney Brick Company to use the road. This permission was granted
to Mrs. Smith's son-in-law and agent. A letter was written by an
agent of Kinney Brick Company to Mrs. Smith confirming the permission. The road was used by lot owners in San Miguel Acres, the
Campfire Girls, and the general public in addition to the plaintiffs.
In 1975 Kinney Brick Company erected a fence across the road.
Plaintiffs filed suit as a result of this action. The District Court of
Bernalillo County found that the plaintiffs had established a prescriptive easement by use across the Kinney land. Defendant appealed.
1. 91 N.M. 646, 579 P.2d 178 (1978).
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The New Mexico Supreme Court held that a prescriptive easement
had not been established because plaintiffs' use had been permissive.2
HISTORY OF PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS IN THE
COMMON LAW AND IN NEW MEXICO
The definition of prescription has been expressed in many different ways. Thompson defined it as "a mode of acquiring title to
incorporeal hereditaments3 by immemorial or long continued enjoyment." 4 Reeves has written that it is the enjoyment of an incorporeal hereditament for so long a time that "the memory of man
runneth not to the contrary."' The New Mexico Supreme Court in
Hester v. Sawyers6 took the functional approach and defined prescription as "a mode of acquiring title to incorporeal hereditaments
by continued use, possession or enjoyment had during the time and
in the manner fixed by law."'
The word prescription is a derivative of praescriptio meaning
"something written first, above, or before." 8 At Roman Law the
praescriptio directed the trier of fact to dispose of any preliminary
matters before coming to the main issue of a land dispute.
English common law on prescription developed in a manner similar to the longa possessio of Roman Law. The longa possessio was a
doctrine used by the praetors as a base for acquiring real servitudes.'
It is not clear whether the common law development was derived
from the Roman doctrine or was a separate but parallel development.
English judges began to apply prescription in the twelfth or thirteenth century. Bracton wrote before 1260 A.D. that a lapse of time
could create rights, that prescriptive use must be "nec vi nec clam
nec precario,"-open as of right-and that longum tempus-a long
period of time-was necessary. 10
2. The facts were found in the briefs and court record of Garmond v. Kinney as well as
the opinion.
3. Those which consist of legal rights capable of being inherited but not of themselves
tangible or visible. Black's Law Dictionary, 859 (4th ed. 1957).
4. G. Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real Property, §335 at 150
(Repl. Vol. 2, 1961).
5. A. Reeves, A Treatise on the Law of Real Property, §154 at 193 (1909) (quoting
Lomax, Dig. 614, 615).
6. 41 N.M. 497, 71 P.2d 646, 112 A.L.R. 536 (1937).
7. Id. at 501, 71 P.2d at 649, 112 A.L.R. at 540 (1937) (quoting 1 Thompson on Real
Property § 372 (1924)).
8. Opala, PraescriptioTemporus And its Relation to Prescriptive Easements in the AngloAmerican Law, 7 Tulsa L.J. 107, 112 (1971).
9. Id. Real servitudes allow the owner of an estate to enjoy the benefit and use of a
neighboring estate. Black's Law Dictionary, 1535 (4th ed. 1957).
10. Id. at 113-15.
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The time period used by English courts to establish an easement by
prescription was fixed in the Statute of Westminster I in 1189.'' If
use could be traced back to the time of Richard I's Coronation, a
prescriptive right was granted. The widely used phrase to support a
claim of prescription was "excedit memoriam hominum," beyond
human memory, or "time whereof the memory of man runneth or
knoweth not to the contrary."' 2
As time passed, the prescriptive period lengthened and eventually
became too long to prove. During the reign of Henry VIII the requisite period of time was fixed at sixty years.' I Eventually this sixtyyear period was found too burdensome and Blackstone created the
fiction of the lost grant.1 Prescriptive right was based on this
"grant" and by 1623 the statutory period for the use had been
reduced to twenty years. Use during this twenty-year period created
a presumption that a grant, which had been lost and could not be
produced as evidence, was the basis for a right by prescription.' ' In
1786 Lord Mansfield declared that a twenty-year period of use
created "such decisive presumption of a right by grant or otherwise
that, unless contradicted or explained, the jury ought to believe
it."' 6 Apparently the English courts were reluctant to admit they
were making law and resorted to the fictional lost grant.' " In 1832
the Prescription Act' I fixed the time period at twenty years and
listed requisites to a prescriptive right.' I
In New Mexico, as well as other jurisdictions across the country,
the fiction of the lost grant was accepted as the basis of a claim of
easement by prescription. "The presumption of the grant of an easement, when indulged, is because the conduct of the other party, in
submitting to the use for so long a time without objection, cannot be
accounted for by any other hypothesis." 2"0 The legal fiction of the
lost grant could not be rebutted by evidence that no grant was ever
made.2 1 Later, the trend was to abandon the fiction of the lost grant
11. 3 Edw. I ch. 39, Thompson §337 at 171 (Repl. Vol. 2, 1961).
12. Opala, supra note 8, at 115.
13. Reeves, supra note 5, §154 at 193.
14. Romans v. Nadler, 14 N.W.2d 482 (Minn. 1944).
15. Reeves, supra note 5, § 154 at 194.
16. Commentary, Interruption of Use: A Prescription For Prescription, 25 U. Fla. L.
Rev. 204, 206 (1972).
17. Simonton, Fictional Lost Grant in Prescription-A Nocuous Archaism, 35 W. Va.
L.Q. 46, 50 (1928).
18. Reeves, supra note 5, § 154 at 194.
19. Id.
20. Thompson, supra note 4, § 337 at 176.
21. Vigil v. Baltzley, 79 N.M. 659, 448 P.2d 171 (1968); Sanchez v. Dale Bellarnah
Homes of New Mexico, Inc., 76 N.M. 526, 528-29, 417 P.2d 25, 27 (1966); Hester v.
Sawyers, 41 N.M. 497, 503-05, 71 P.2d 646, 649-50, 112 A.L.R. 536 (1937).
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and to treat the right as being acquired by statute in a way similar to
acquisition of title by adverse possession.2 2 Confusion exists not
only as to the theory upon which prescription is based, but also as to
the legal requisites and consequences of prescription. There is some
doubt as to whether prescription exists as a separate common law
doctrine, or whether it is dependent entirely upon statutes of limitation, and the extent to which it is a mere corollary to the doctrine of
adverse possession.2 3 This confusion appears in New Mexico as well
as other jurisdictions, although the lost grant doctrine, and not the
statute doctrine, was affirmed in recent case law. 2 '
REQUISITE ELEMENTS FOR PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT IN

NEW MEXICO

The leading decision concerning prescriptive easement in New
Mexico is Hester v. Sawyers,2 an action brought to establish an
easement by prescription across an adjoining landowner's property.
The appellant's land was fenced on three sides and had a road across
it which appellee began to use when he purchased his tract. Later,
the appellee erected a fence between the two properties and graded,
maintained, and regularly used a new road parallel to the old. Appellee, as well as his tenants, visitors, and those who had business with
him, used the new road without permission of appellant, and kept it
graded and in good condition. When appellant obstructed the road
with a fence, appellee brought suit.
The court found that permission existed to use the old road but
not the new one. When appellee established, maintained, and used
the new road continuously for more than ten years, his use was
presumed hostile and adverse, and an easement by prescription was
established.
The court identified the requisite elements of prescriptive easement. "The use necessary to acquire title by prescription must be
open, uninterrupted, peaceable, notorious, adverse, under a claim of
right, and continue for a period of ten years with the knowledge or
imputed knowledge of the owner." 2 6 The statutory period for adverse possession was ten years and the court relied on that statute to
22. Maestas v. Maestas, 50 N.M. 276, 175 P.2d 1003 (1946); Hester v. Sawyers, 41 N.M.
497, 71 P.2d 646, 112 A.L.R. 536 (1937).
23. Haines v. Galles, 76 Wyo. 411, 303 P.2d 1004 (1956).
24. Vigil v. Baltzley, 79 N.M. 659, 660-61, 448 P.2d 171, 172-73 (1968); Sanchez v.
Dale Bellamah Homes of New Mexico, Inc., 76 N.M. 526, 528, 417 P.2d 25, 27 (1966);
Castillo v. Tabet Lumber Co., 75 N.M. 492, 494, 406 P.2d 361, 362 (1965); Hester v.
Sawyers, 41 N.M. 497,503, 71 P.2d 646, 650, 112 A.L.R. 536, 541 (1937).
25. Hester v. Sawyers, 41 N.M. 497, 71 P.2d 646, 112 A.L.R. 536 (1937).
26. Id. at 504, 71 P.2d at 651, 112 A.L.R. at 542.
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determine the necessary period of time for a right by prescription to
mature. The court displayed the confusion of the courts nationwide
by relying on the statute on adverse possession without explaining
the theory behind its use.
Two elements set out by the court in Hester have concerned the
courts in subsequent cases. The problems addressed by the courts
have centered on the elements of adverse use under a claim of right
and notice to the owner of the servient estate. A discussion of the
judicial decisions on these issues in an attempt to clarify their present
meanings follows.
ADVERSE USE UNDER A CLAIM OF RIGHT
In Hester the court found that the owners of large bodies of
private, unenclosed land had allowed persons to pass over them and
that individual use of such a way or road could not create an easement by prescription. The court recognized that while a presumption
of adverse use would be found for enclosed tracts of land, an exception would arise whenever an easement by prescription was claimed
over large, unenclosed areas. In such instances permission would be
presumed and would defeat a claim of easement by prescription
because the use of the area would not be adverse and the user would
not be making a claim of right.
In Wilson v. Williams2" the court reaffirmed the Hester opinion.
Wilson sued Williams to enjoin him from obstructing a road on Williams' property which Wilson claimed was public. Williams came into
possession of his land by homestead. Before he acquired the property
there had been continuous use of the road for thirty-five years by the
public. The court held that the requisite period of use to establish an
easement by prescription was determined by the statute of limitations for adverse possession. The court found that the prescriptive
use had matured on the land long before it had become private land
through homestead and a settler took the land subject to any easements already on it. The court also reaffirmed the holding in Hester
that a presumption of adverse use did not arise when the land was
open and unenclosed.
In Mutz v. LeSage2 ' plaintiff sued for a declaratory judgment that
an easement by prescription had been created over a road across
defendant's fenced land. The court affirmed the decision below that
defendant's land had been fenced since 1907 and a presumption of
permissive use did not apply to enclosed lands. Plaintiff and his
27. 43 N.M. 173, 87 P.2d 683 (1939).
28. 61 N.M. 219, 297 P.2d 876 (1956).

NEW MEXICO LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 9

father had used the road since 1920 and adverse use was presumed.
A subsequent case involved an agreement entered into by plaintiff
and defendant for the common use of an alleyway between their
properties.2 9 Later the contract was deemed void because it lacked
the signatures of their wives. Plaintiff's tenant erected a building
which encroached upon the alleyway and defendant responded by
blocking the alley. When plaintiff sued to enjoin defendant's action
the court looked to the voided contract and held that a prescriptive
easement had not been established because the easement at its inception had been permissive. The court held that "a prescriptive right
cannot grow out of a strictly permissive use, no matter how long the
use."

30

In Castillo v. Tabet Lumber Co. 3 1 plaintiff used a road across
defendant's property for over sixty years. When defendant barricaded the road plaintiff brought suit to establish an easement by
prescription. The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's decision for plaintiff. Defendant's lot was not a large tract of
open and unenclosed land and plaintiff's use was not presumed to be
permissive. The court also found that plaintiff did not have to be the
sole user of the road; others crossing defendant's lot for their own
purposes did not defeat plaintiff's claim of easement by prescription.
In Sanchez v. Dale Bellamah Homes of New Mexico, Inc." 2 the
plaintiff, Sanchez, owned a twenty-acre parcel of land south of Santa
Fe. His access to the highway was across a vacant tract of land which
was subsequently purchased by defendant, who developed the land
and cut off Sanchez's access. The court found that a prescriptive
easement had been established. It held that use was presumed to be
adverse when there was no evidence as to how it began. Because the
Bellemah tract was relatively small, and the road over it was only onehalf mile long, the exception for open and unenclosed lands did not
apply. In keeping with the majority of jurisdictions, the court held
that "a prescriptive right is founded upon a presumption of a grant
even though there may never have been one." 3 The court followed
Hester and stated that the presumption of a grant was conclusive.
In Vigil v. Baltzley,3" defendant locked gates and fences on his
land barring plaintiff's various uses of herding cattle, hunting and
fishing. The court found defendant's property enclosed and refused
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

71 N.M. 454, 379 P.2d 443 (1963).
Id. at 458, 379 P.2d at 445.
75 N.M. 492, 406 P.2d 361 (1965).
76 N.M. 526, 417 P.2d 25 (1966).
Id. at 528, 417 P.2d at 26.
79 N.M. 659, 448 P.2d 171 (1968).
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to apply the exception of permission. It quoted from the Castillo
opinion:
In Hester v. Sawyers, supra (citations omitted) it was determined
that title to an easement for a right of way could be acquired by
prescription; that the right is obtained by use alone and is based
upon a presumed grant, not upon statute; that under our law the
period of use must be ten years, the same as the limitation period
provided by law applicable to adverse possession of land; that the
presumption of a grant of the right is conclusive upon the passage of
ten years of open, uninterrupted, peaceable, notorious and adverse
use under a claim of right with knowledge or imputed knowledge of
the owner; that when such use is present for the requisite period the
owner is charged with knowledge of it, and acquiescence is implied;
and that the right may arise even though it was originally permissive,
if it subsequently became adverse and the adverse use continued for
a full ten years.35
The court found that an easement by prescription had been established and affirmed the judgment for plaintiff.
Garmond v. Kinney 3 6 is the latest decision by the New Mexico
Supreme Court dealing with permissive use. Because Kinney Brick
Company had given Alcie Smith permission to use the road across its
land, the court held that the continuous use for the ten-year period
was not adverse and under a claim of right and a prescriptive easement was not established.
The court also concluded that the use of the road by the general
public defeated an adverse claim, notwithstanding the Castillo decision which had held that use by others for their own purposes would
not defeat a claim of prescriptive easement. 3 ' The court followed
the decision in Martinez v. Mundy3 8 which held that an easement
by prescription could not be acquired "by usage 'common with and
similar to that of the general public.'
9 The Garmond court went
on to find that "based on the evidence in the record, plaintiffs failed
to show that they used the roadway adversely to Kinney's inter"3

est."4

0

NOTICE

New Mexico's approach to the notice requirement is similar to its
treatment of notice for adverse possession. Either real or constructive
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 660, 448 P.2d at 172.
91 N.M. 646, 579 P.2d 178 (1978).
75 N.M. 492, 406 P.2d 361 (1965).
61 N.M. 87, 295 P.2d 209 (1956).
91 N.M. at 647, 579 P.2d at 179.

40. Id.
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notice will suffice to put the owner of the servient estate on guard to
the use being made of his property. In Southern Union Gas Co. v.
Cantrell'' the prior owner of Cantrell's land granted a perpetual
right to the Gas Company to construct and maintain a main gas
transmission line for a consideration of $25.00. The written grant
was lost and never recorded. Defendant took the land without notice
of the easement. There was an absence of constructive notice since
the easement was neither recorded nor visible. The court held that
Cantrell, as a bona fide purchaser, took the land free of the easement. It stated that "it is to be seen that a user cannot be termed
'adverse' in the required sense when the one against whom the right
is claimed ... could never have protested the exercise of the right,
4
because ignorant of the fact that any such right was claimed." 2 In
4
Castillo, " the court said that "when such use is present for the
requisite period the owner is charged with knowledge of it and acquithe court charged the
In Sanchez,4
escence is implied . . . ."
defendant with knowledge of the road across its property because a
visual confirmation could have easily been made. Similarly, in Vigil v.
Baltzley,4 6 the court quoted Sanchez and held that "the owner is
charged with knowledge of an open, adverse, notorious, peaceable,
and uninterrupted use from which acquiesence is implied." 4
Plaintiff sued for a declaratory judgment that he had established
an easement by prescription over defendant's fenced lands in Mutz v.
LeSage.4 8 Defendant had fenced his lands after a road had been
established across them, but plaintiffs use began subsequent to the
construction of the fences. The court applied the presumption of
adverse use and further held that the well-defined road was enough
to charge defendant with notice.
In Sedillo Title Guaranty,Inc. v. Wagner,4 9 the Wagners attempted
to transfer plaintiff's original easement from the northerly to the
southerly end of their tract. The Wagners had actual and constructive
knowledge of the recorded easement when they purchased the land.
The court held that "the location of an easement when once established cannot be changed by either party without the other's consent
except under the authority of a grant or reservation to this ef41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

56
Id.
75
Id.
76
79
Id.
61
80

N.M. 184, 241 P.2d 1209 (1952).
at 193, 241 P.2d at 1215.
N.M. 492, 406 P.2d 361 (1965).
at 494, 406 P.2d at 362.
N.M. 526, 530, 417 P.2d 25, 28 (1966).
N.M. 659, 448 P.2d 171 (1968).
at 661, 448 P.2d at 173.
N.M. 219, 297 P.2d 876 (1956).
N.M. 429, 457 P.2d 361 (1969).
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fect." 0 The court also held that " 'the owner of the servient tenement is charged with notice of facts which an inquiry would have
disclosed.' ,,1
CONCLUSION
Prescriptive easement evolved through Roman and common law to
the modem claim of title that exists today. It is a creature of both
the courts and the legislatures and has the dubious distinction of
being justified by the theory of a fictional lost grant. Its purpose is to
legally recognize a long-established use even to the detriment of the
owner in fee. Prescriptive easement increases the productivity and
usefulness of the land and it is doubtful that the doctrine will ever be
abolished.
In light of the fact that with every claim asserted a new fact
pattern emerges, courts will continue to determine whether another
easement by prescription has been established. Garmond v. Kinney is
the latest decision in a series of opinions that have defined and
redefined the elements necessary to establish an easement by prescription.
JANE G.PRINTZ

50. Id. at 431, 457 P.2d at 363.
51. Id. (quoting from Sanchez v. Dale Bellamah Homes of New Mexico, Inc., 76 N.M.
526, 530, 417 P.2d 25, 28 (1966).

